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ABSTRACT

Many studies have been done to evaluate China’s transitional economy and its
impacts on the public health sector. It is a widely accepted proposition that the market
reform initiated in the late 1980s significantly changed the public health sector. While
some scholars argue that the Chinese people’s overall health status has improved
compared to that of the pre-reform era, others identify declining health expenditures and
widening regional gaps, indicating quite a dim health situation. In this thesis, I argue that
market reforms have not improved the people’s access to health services. In the reform
era, the overall civil health status had been declining due to insufficient public and
governmental lack of financial support for the public health sector. The collapse of the
Rural Cooperative Health System (RCHS) reduced rural residents’ access to healthcare
and thus greatly diminished their health benefits. Similarly, the downsizing work unit in
urban areas also reduced urban residents’ social welfare, including healthcare benefits. I
assessed market reform impacts on China’s health sector. The newly-established market
mechanisms and empirical consequences of market reforms, from the perspective of both
inside and outside of the public health sector, related to the public health sector are thus
evaluated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Why should I assess market reform impacts in the public health sector? Before I
move on to the discussion of market impacts, there is a need to interpret the academic
importance of studying the public health sector. A World Bank report indicates several
developing challenges that China need to address (World Bank 2003). One of these
challenges is unequal access to health care. Paradoxically, China has been evolving from
a socialist state to a profit-maximizing and commercial-oriented state in only 20 years.
The public health sector is one of the major areas that experienced radical
commercialization, characterized with decreased political control and increased
autonomy of health facilities (Bloom 1997). In the commercialization process, the
previously publicly financed health sector was now being restructured to be a
self-supported, sustainable, and independent industry. The market reform aimed to
motivate local governments and public sectors to be self-supporting and self-managing.
According to the State Council, the market reform was a great effort on releasing
constraints for some economic departments which expected to be more activated.
In addition to rampant reforms outside the health sector, the market reform is also
performing in the public health sector domain. The market reform influences in the health
sector are called internal impacts, whereas those outside of the health sector are called
1

external impacts. By internally, I refer to those market mechanisms introduced in the
health sector. These mechanisms included the increasing independency of hospitals on
the respective governments for separation of drug selling with medical care providers,
price reforms relating to health services and medicine, market-oriented hospital
management reforms, and newly established patient-hospital relations in the absence of
governmental intervention. By externally, I refer to market reforms happening outside the
health sector. These reforms are seen within the big picture of China’s economic
transitions. These reforms, widely discussed by scholars, include: 1) rural Household
Responsibility Reform; 2) urban enterprise reform; 3) nationwide price and merchandise
reforms; 4) profound fiscal and revenue reforms; and 5) local-central relation adjustment
in terms of economic responsibility and development.
It came to my attention that both external and internal market reforms have had some
impact on the public health sector. In order to assess the market reform impacts, I will
evaluate both these impacts.
The research question I address in this paper includes three subsets. First, in what
perspectives has the health sector been changed by market reform? It is widely accepted
that the Chinese health sector has changed due to market reforms. However, it is not clear
in the extant literature whether the health sector was better or worse compared to the
pre-reform era. In this study, I try to find out how significant these changes are for
China’s health sector transition.
2

Second, did market reforms change the Chinese health sector internally or externally?
In transforming the Chinese health sector, is the market reform inside the health sector or
outside the sector the most important factor? This question attracted my attention because
the market mechanism was always flexible compared with governmental regulations
(Byrd 1991). I want to clarify that market reform outside the health sector is much
stronger than inside the health sector. This question will help us understand that China’s
public sector, including the health care sector, was still less commercialized compared to
other economic sectors. However, this does claim commercialization in public sectors is
good. Conversely, experience with western developed countries, especially the U.S.,
showed that commercialization has had some negative impact on public sectors.
Third, how do we assess market reform impacts on the Chinese health sector? Are
these positive or negative impacts? This question involves market reform impacts
assessment on the three major players: individuals, governments, and the health care
sector. I want to discuss the different impacts that market reforms have had on these
related players.
All in all, these research questions address the study of the Chinese transitional
public health care sector. This study will help us understand how the public health sector
is managed under China’s transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based
economy. The extant literature mostly focused on the transition happening inside the
health sector. There was not much light shed on the external market reform impact on
3

health sector transition. This study tries to evaluate the significant role the Chinese
government in the health sector which is different from traditional studies, the
relationship between the government and health sector transition, and market reform
impacts on the Chinese health care system.
Many scholars believe that the Chinese health sector is being transformed to a
market-based system (Bloom 1999; Coyne 2002; Gail 1995). Some studies have
evaluated the impact that the market mechanism has had on the health sector (Ho 1995).
In the post-reform era, out-of-pocket medical costs in China have expanded due to
various factors such as high inflation rates, low percent of GDP spent on healthcare, and
declining insurance coverage (Coyne 2002). In this study, I argue that the Chinese health
care system has been greatly changed because of market mechanisms introduced in the
past ten years. People’s access to health services has become unequal due to the
government’s inadequate recession from the public health sector and the laissez-faire.
Today’s health care sector has been reshaped as a profit-seeking market-based system
which is thus unfriendly to many people in need of health services. In other words, the
present health sector is inadequate for the Chinese society due to the downsizing role
played by the government and the increasing reliance on the market mechanism in the
post-reform era.
Yanrui Wu suggests that health spending increased due to the improvement in living
standards and changing health care system (Wu 1997). Another study indicates that
4

medical cost escalation was partly due to bad health management; for instance, adoption
of high-tech medicine and abusive expensive drugs usage (Liu 1995a). A market
mechanism has not improved the Chinese people’s overall health status (Liu 1999). Rural
residents suffer from health care system reforms because of decreased governmental
financial aid (Carrin 1999). Not surprisingly, Chinese people are suffering from
increasing medical costs and declining public financial support. Therefore, I argue that
the Chinese people’s overall health status quo has not been improved in the reform era.
On the contrary, unequal access to health services among the different social groups and
diminishing coverage of health insurance indicates that the overall market reform impact
is not all that positive on the Chinese society. Since many people are losing their health
insurance program and benefits, they have come to doubt market reform and thus hinder
ongoing reforms. If, in the near future, the government cannot provide adequate health
services for those worse-off social groups, market reforms will make the Chinese society
a disaster rather than properties.
The primary goal of this study is to find out and then evaluate market reform impacts
on the health sector and its political and social consequences. As I mentioned earlier, my
core argument is that market reform introduced by the Chinese government reduced the
people’s health benefits and thus the reform strategies should be adjusted to meet future
challenges.

5

Figure 1.1 explains the analysis frame that I will conduct in this study. The analysis
of the market reform impact focuses on the interaction among four players: the
government, market, health care sector, and the individual. Obviously, the relationship
between market and government and those between market and health sector are the most
crucial of this article. As indicated in figure 1.1, arrows representing the market impact
on government and the health sector are emphasized. Another important relationship
evaluated in this article, as figure 1.1 shows, is the market impact on individuals,
emphasized by an amplified dark arrow. To measure transformation of the health sector,
the individual’s health status is also investigated.

Market

Individual

Government

Health Sector

Figure 1.1 Analyzing the Market Impact in the Context of Interaction
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Instead of the government, I will put much more emphasis on evaluating the role the
market played in translating the public health sector. However, this is not to say that the
market has replaced the government in managing the public health sector. My analysis
goal is to find the improper impact of market reforms and the possible causation between
reform and sustainable development. In order to explain increased market impact, the
declining role of government in providing health services is also measured. The
individual health status is measured to find the significance of the health sector transition.
I will compare the people’s access to healthcare and their status quo in the post-reform
era to those in the pre-reform era.
To undertake this study, I used data from three sources: one is the World
Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank. This dataset offered current
overviews of timeseries data from 1990 to 2001. Various economic indicators were
included in this data. Second, detailed health expenditures and the Chinese people’s
health status came from the Ministry of Health (MoH) statistics. This dataset provided
information about public health expenditures, medical personnel (including physicians
and nurses), and health facilities from 1980 to 2002. Third, The World Health Report
provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Key Indicators of Developing
Asian and Pacific Countries provided by Asian Development Bank were used as
supplements for the previous two datasets.

7

Chapter II
THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The Impact of Market Reforms

China’s market economic reforms have been the subject of research interest since the
1980s. The development of market mechanisms emerging in the 1990s is only a part of
China’s great economic transition. However, as William Byrd pointed out, the market
reform is a crucial part of China’s rapid economic growth and modernization (Byrd 1991).
According to the extant literature, economists do not have a unified definition of the
market mechanism. Byrd widely discussed various theories and their criticisms of market
mechanism (Byrd 1991; 1989). Schumpeter and Clark viewed the market as a much more
dynamic and procedural mechanism (Schumpeter 1976; Clark 1961), a principle Byrd
emphasized in explaining China’s incomplete market institutions, is also followed in this
article.
Market reforms have had profound impacts on contemporary China’s social and
economic transitions. Accompanying China’s economic development, market reforms
impact has attracted many scholars’ attention (Goldstein 1995; Grogan 1995; Nolan 1993;
1994; Rawski 1994a; b; Walder 1995b; Nee 1991). It comes as no surprise that market
reforms are deemed to have both negative (Jha 2002; Renard 2002) and positive impacts
8

on China’s transitional society and economy. The majority of the literature on China’s
market reforms focuses on the positive role played by markets in transforming its
centrally planned economic system to a market-oriented economy. Some research on this
approach goes even further to uncover the impacts of the newly-established market
mechanism on various socioeconomic subjects, such as the reform of state-owned
enterprises (Duckett 1998), changing state-society relations (Walder 1995b; Sicular 1995),
forging of the civil culture and market norms (Nee 1991), evolution of labor forces
(Walder 1991; White 1987; Chen 2003), and the achievement of non-state economic
sectors (Goldstein 1995).

Economic Implications

Using economic indicators, herein the market mechanism, to assess China’s social
and political issues became popularly accepted among researchers. This economic
approach wave reached its peak in the late 1980s. The frequently targeted questions
comprise three major fields. One comparison is between China’s significant economic
achievements and the stagnation witnessed in the former Soviet Unions and East
European Communist Countries (Jha 2002). Second, some assess the implication of
economic reforms on the Leninist-Stalinist political institutions (Walder 1995b). Third,
many studies estimate the social and cultural consequences of the ongoing radical and
9

asymmetrical economic reforms (Perry 1985).
The economic approach, which focuses exclusively on economic indicators, is
relatively insufficient in predicting market reform institutional consequences. In the early
1990s, however, the economic approach was gradually replaced by the new institutional
approach, which treated the market economy as a substantial institution and assesseed its
social and political implications by various scales. It has been noted by some scholars
that, after the initial market reforms, a new social structure tangibly changed the
party-state, central-local, and public-private relationships in China (Zhang 2000; Sullivan
1990; Byrd 1991). The new institutional approach treats market reforms as the onset of
China’s social and economic changes since the late 1970s. Researchers in this approach
take the market as an exogenous variable and measure its significant impact on China’s
transition (Putterman 1995; Holton 1991; Wu 2003).

Political Implications

Political implications of market reforms are also discussed in various studies. Since
almost miraculous economic achievements have been witnessed in the post-reform era,
researchers interested in institutional subsequences of market reforms try to search for
alternative interpretations for the path to China’s reform. Some studies focus on the
distinctions between a market economy and a command economy in distributing
10

resources and adopting strategies to satisfy individual or institutional needs (Nee 1989;
Wu 2003; Nolan 1994; Holton 1991). The comparative advantage of the market economy
is well addressed by researchers. However, the risk is also obvious. For instance, Andrew
Walder suggested that China’s market reforms “postponed the difficult tasks of final price
and ownership reform” (Walder 1995a). This argument is reinforced by Perry Jha’s
findings. In his book The Perilous Road to the Market, Jha devotes an entire chapter on
analyzing the sustainability of China’s transitions and growth and finds that “China had
reached a watershed in its economic transition…. political and economic imperatives
were in direct conflict with each other in the reforms that lay ahead” (Jha 2002: 69).
According to his analyses, Walder suggested that, in the long run, China should release
government agencies' incentives. Jha points out that a complete market reform is badly
needed in facilitating China’s sustainable transformation.
Another trend puts more emphasis on local incentives. Chinese local governments
ignored social welfare provisions, including health services, when they set economic
development as their top goal. Not surprisingly, local leaderships encouraged market
reform at the cost of social welfare. In this perspective, the role of local governments is
negative on the health sector. There are numerous studies on China’s local governmental
economic involvements. One noted study done by Jean Oi suggests that local
governmental economic involvements contributed to China’s robust development (Oi
1995). Using research on Tianjin city, Jane Duckett argues that Chinese individual
11

departments and officers, encouraged by both economic profits and political stimuli, are
enthusiastically involved in the market economy. Both Oi’s and Duckett’s studies indicate
the Chinese state’s adaptation to the market economy. They emphasize the economic role
played by the local governments in China’s transformation. The difference, however, is
that Oi highlights the local government's crucial role in propelling market reforms, while
Duckett emphasizes the economic motives of individual government officers. However,
one unnoticed change is that the engagement of the local government in commercial
issues has had a rather negative impact on the health care sector, in terms of financial
support, health personnel provisions, and health facility management.
A third trend is a much more microeconomic view of assessing market reform
impacts which is found in the enterprise reform literature. The reform of ownership and
property rights in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), rather than anything else, are subject to
academic debates in the context of market reform (Putterman 1995; Guo 2003; Steinfeld
1998; Banks 2003). The key issue in this trend is that the Chinese market economy is
plausible because of the absence of privatization. The debates about ownership or
property rights of SOEs are not whether a market economy or a command economy is
dominant but rather to what degree that property rights are held by private individuals
(Stiglitz 1994; Steinfeld 1998). According to neoclassic assumptions, the market
mechanism would not work properly had market participants seized property rights. That
is, the Chinese market is incomplete due to sluggish privatization of SOE property rights.
12

The fourth trend extends studies of market reforms to the public service sectors.
Public goods, including health care, environmental protection, and social security, are
influenced by market reform (Ho 1995; Lo 2001; Leung 2003). This group of scholars
assesses the market reform impact on social welfare. Their arguments focus upon whether
the market mechanism is sufficient to deliver social welfare in terms of equality,
efficiency, and sustainability. China’s health care sector is well-discussed in this approach
(Coyne 2002; Gail 1995; Gerald 1997; Gu 1995; Ho 1995; Hu 1999). Since Chinese
reform was initiated in the economic sectors rather than social or political sectors,
commercial gains or economic profits are the reformers’ major interests. The
governmental officers, encouraged by party leaders, became commercial predators.
Duckett suggests that China is actually evolving into an “entrepreneurial state.” Instead
of seeking benefit from rent, Chinese governmental officers are profit-seeking and, to
some extent, they are new business elites (Duckett 1998). As a result, the social welfare
cause is subordinate to economic development in most Chinese policies. Public health
care, a burden on governmental finances, is facing stiff fiscal and facility shortages.
I have briefly discussed the literature on China’s market reforms, in which the
political implications of market reforms are classified into four broad categories. The
political approach is mainly dealing with governmental choice over policies. Since the
social development is always entangled with objective conflicts among different social
groups, it is crucial for political scientists to describe and discuss the government’s role in
13

the decision-making process. The market reform received intense study in the
market-government interaction context. In the policy analysts’ view, government plays a
significant role in policy making (DiNitto 2000). Policies are the consequences, or
sometimes combinations, of civil interests, national goals, and bureaucratic influences
(Chen 1996).
My research focus is China’s transitional health care sector under the influence of
market reforms. In order to assess the impacts, I will discuss two important market
reform perspectives. One is that the government relies on the market mechanism to
achieve its goals. The second is that the market reform changes the government’s
behaviors or strategies in obtaining its goals. It is not surprising that market reforms have
had profound impacts on Chinese society. Some social relationships, such as those
between state and society, or public and individuals, have been subject to market reforms.
I chose, however, the public health sector to deeply investigate how much the market
reform has influenced this sector.

Public Health Care in Transition

A World Bank report in 2002 discussed the concept of public health in detail. The
report points out that public health is actually the responsibility for both individuals and
collective organizations (World Bank 2002). The purpose of public health is to ensure
14

that every citizen in the community enjoys a standard level of healthcare and thus a
sustainable development of the society becomes possible. The mission of public health
involves at least three players: the government, individuals, and public service agencies.
However, it is not clear which one should take the chief responsibility in the public health
system. The understanding is extremely blurred in China, where the communist ideology
is collapsed in association with the wide-range market reform. A survey on the Chinese
perspective toward social welfare indicates that a majority of the Chinese people
generally agrees that the state should take a larger share of welfare responsibility. A large
group (73.1%) of respondents does not want to be responsible for medical expenses
(Wong 2001). Since the survey was done in Shanghai, China’s biggest city and most
advanced area, the nationwide reliance on the state could be even stronger.
China’s gradualist reforms and economic strategies leave many political and
institutional problems untouched. This reform approach might be efficient in upgrading
China’s large economy in a relatively short period. However, the achievement in
economy is, to a great extent, at the sacrifice of social and political developments (Zhang
2000; Jha 2002; Wong 2001). In the process of economic transition, where the Chinese
economy is forced to dance with a market mechanism, the Chinese government has not
been transferred to be in line with the market system. In this view, China’s market reform
is incomplete (Byrd 1991). Therefore, the disharmony of China’s political institutions and
the newly established market system attracts many scholars’ attention (Nolan 1993).
15

Because in China most health related services are still provided or maintained by the
government, many studies have been done to investigate the role of the Chinese
government in public health (Coyne 2002; DiNitto 2000; Gu 1995; Guan 2000). These
investigations are extremely interesting because of the finding that the role played by the
government has been changed by the newly established market system. Discussions about
waning governmental regulation in the reform era are subjects of intense interests
(Walder 1995b). These discussions are extremely prevalent among scholars who are
interested in explaining China’s unique economic transition and its political implications.
For others, it is not interesting to deal with boring official documents and
organizational procedures. Instead, they focus their study on health care financing issues
associated with market reform. They believe that the funding and financing of public
health are core issues (Gu 1995; Liu 1996; Liu 2002a; Hu 1981; Liu 1995b). Some
researchers focus on the health care insurance system and find that China’s health care
sector is shifting from a heavily public subsidized system to a market-based system (Hu
1999; Cheung 2001; Ho 1995). Since financing and health insurance are crucial
parameters in assessing a state’s health care system, it is not surprising that the majority
of China’s health care literature is found in this approach. The impacts of market reforms
and economic transitions are widely discussed in various articles.
Another trend in China’s health care literature, however, turns to inquiring about the
Chinese people’s health status quo in the reform era. Through comparing health facilities,
16

insurance coverage, medical costs, and patterns of searching for medical services in the
post-reform era with those of the pre-reform era, some scholars find that the Chinese
people’s health status quo has been changed significantly (Wu 1997; Liu 1995a; Grogan
1995). Some studies evaluate the equitability of different social groups in receiving health
services in the post-reform era (Akin 2004; Henderson 1995; Liu 1999). The health
situations of some social groups such as females, children, and the aged are also
investigated (Li 2001).
Obviously, the relationship between market reforms and health sector transitions
received intense attention. It is widely accepted that investigations on China’s health
sector cannot remove market reform impact. Whether negative or positive, market
reforms have had profound impacts on China’s transitional health sectors. Although some
researchers argue that people’s health status has had a significant impact on the state’s
economic growth (Bloom 2004), the causal-effect direction of this article is clearly going
through economic reforms on the people’s health status quo. This is, however, not going
to claim that economic reform caused fluctuation in the people’s health status is the only
possible causality. It is the prediction power of social science that prescribes a
measurement of causality should be done in this way.

17

CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSITIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
SECTOR

China’s health care institutions are organized into a vertical structure (Fu 2003). The
health care institution comprises three substantial components. First, within the Chinese
bureaucracy, healthcare agencies are set up at different administrative levels. At the
national level, there are the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Labor (MoL)
who are responsible for health service administration (Wu 1997). The structure and
responsibilities at the central government level are duplicated at the local administrative
level. At the national level, there are health bureaus at regional, city, and county levels
responsible for health service administration in respective districts.
Second, the Epidemic Prevention Service (EPS) system is a supplement for the
formal healthcare institution. EPS operates preventive stations for disease control at
provincial, regional, and county levels (Fu 2003). The academy of Preventive Medicine is
responsible for research in preventive medicine and technical support. Some
disease-prevention stations are established at local levels, making them responsible for
disease control. There are about 3600 anti-epidemic stations and 1800 specialized
independent institutions responsible for disease control at the county level (Liu 2002a).
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Third, health services are provided by general or specialized hospitals. Enterprises in
China, Different from other countries, play an important role in providing medical
services. Traditionally, Chinese enterprises are owned and run by the state. Most of these
state-run enterprises are required to finance and run a health clinic for their employees.
Some hospitals are even run by the Chinese army. There are 300 army-run hospitals,
mainly in urban areas (Wu 1997).

The Three-Tier Health Service System

Actually, there are three tiers of health service systems that exist separately in rural
and urban areas. In rural areas, the three tiers constructed rural health services before the
market reforms initiated in the 1980s (Shi 1993). They are village-located health stations,
township health centers, and county hospitals (Figure 3.1).

County Hospital
Township Health Center
Village
Health
Station

Township Health Center
Village
Health
Station

Village
Health
Station

Figure 3.1 Rural Three-Tier Medical Care Network
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Village
Health
Station

The characters of the three-tier health service system are well-documented (Fu 2003).
At the township and village level, there are 50,000 health centers located in townships
and almost 800,000 health stations located in villages. Barefoot doctors, who worked in
village health stations, were trained only three month before being licensed to provide
medical services in rural areas. Before the 1980s, they were almost the only medical
staffs available for the rural population.
Health centers at township levels provide more professional medical services with
their well-trained personnel and high-quality facilities. However, a complicated illness is
always treated at a county hospital. Patients are recommended to county hospitals when
their diseases could not be well-treated at the village health stations or commune health
centers. The costs of medical treatment are proportionally or entirely covered by RCMSs.
In some areas, cash payments by patients could be reimbursed by collective funds (Feng
1995).
In urban areas, the health service structure is very similar to rural areas. The three
tiers include street health stations, community health centers, and district hospitals
(Figure 3.2). Most health service providers were state-run hospitals or clinics managed
and financed by the Ministry of Health (MoH) or its local branches. Some clinics were
funded through public employee insurance. Urban health service was based on
widespread state ownership and the principle of full employment, and was provided
primarily through state workplaces.
20
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Community Health Center

Street

Street

Street

Street
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Figure 3.2 Urban Three-Tier Health Service Network

The Public Health Insurance System

China introduced two independent insurance systems in the early 1950s. One was the
Government Employee Health Insurance System (GIS) which offered health insurance
programs for virtually all government employees, college students and the staff, and
employees in non-profit organizations. The other one was the Labor Health Insurance
System (LIS) which covered all workers in the public economic sector. Both insurance
systems covered only urban residents. They were financed by general revenue and
usually provided full payment for the insurant’s medical costs.
In rural areas, the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) was responsible for
the rural residents’ health insurance programs and, to some extent, provided rural
21

population with basic health services for free, or at very low cost in some districts. The
RCMS was established in almost every village during the 1960s and 1970s because of
full governmental support. It was reported that more than 90% of China’s villages had
established a RCMS by the mid-1970s (Carrin 1999). However, the RCMS collapsed due
to market reforms in the 1980s (Ho 1995; Shi 1993). The percentage of rural people
covered by RCMSs dropped to only 6.6% in 1998 (see table 3.1). More than 87.3% of the
rural population has to pay out of pocket for medical care. A World Bank report points
out that China’s rural financial system still needs to be improved (World Bank 2003).
Although the government claims that basic health services are provided to the poor,
China still lacks a comprehensive nationwide risk-sharing health insurance system for
rural health expenditures.

Table 3.1 Medical Secure System in 1998(%)
Total

Urban

Government
4.9
Labor Insurance
6.2
Partial Labor Insurance
1.6
Medical Insurance
1.9
Socialized Fund
0.4
Cooperative Insurance
5.6
Self Payment
76.4
Others
3.0
Source: National Survey on Health Service in 1998.
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16.0
22.9
5.8
3.3
1.4
2.7
44.1
3.7

Rural
1.2
0.5
0.2
1.4
0.0
6.6
87.3
2.8

The health insurance coverage is much better in urban areas. Before the 1980s,
virtually all urban residents were covered by GISs or LISs. However, this percentage also
dropped to less than 40% in 1998 (see table 3.1). Urban residents could receive health
services completely free of charge compared to the rural population. Similar to other
welfares earned by urban residents, both GIS and LIS delivered medical care services
through a person’s employer. Members covered by GISs and LISs could receive many
free outpatient and inpatient medical services. Before economic reforms were introduced
in urban areas, a work unit was responsible for its members’ welfare from cradle to grave.
In some big state enterprises, a worker’s dependents were also included in the
enterprise-funded health care programs. In addition to income, medical services became a
crucial part of numerous welfare benefits enjoyed by urban residents. According to the
rule of the Chinese government, each enterprise should set aside a fixed percentage of its
total payroll for its LIS fund (Hu 1981). Enterprises with more than 200 employees could
set up and manage their own clinics, providing some basic medical services to employees.
Nevertheless, complicated medical services were mainly provided by public hospitals.
There were cooperative relations between the enterprise-based clinics and public
hospitals. Illnesses that were not urgent or complex were always treated in clinics.
Seriously ill patients were always recommended to well-equipped public hospitals.
Both GIS and LIS were not national insurance systems. Their insurance benefits
were employment-based. Some areas began to eliminate the welfare differences between
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urban residents, in the early 1990s, pooling the risks of financial burdens caused by
medical expenditures. The latest policy of the Chinese government is to establish a
national health care insurance system which will pool financial risks for urban residents
(Liu 2002b). Prior to the reform, urban residents relied heavily on their work units for
medical services. Workers are tied to their employers by a range of policy constraints.
Under the command economic system, the employees get benefits while the employers
bear the costs. In 1988, the State Council set up a group to work out a health care reform
program. Risk pooling was introduced in 1992 for urban health care reforms (see figure
3.3). Risk pooling increased the level of socialization and reduced welfare differences
among urban residents. In addition, individual medical accounts were created for every
insured urban resident. This is called the social insurance program (shebao jihua).

Benefits Structure
Contributions

Employer
6% of wage
Employee
2%

2 Accounts

Social
Risk Pool
Fund
4.2%
Individual
Saving

Supplementary
Max Social Risk
Pool Fund Pay (4
Times Wages)
Deductible (10%
Wages)
Outpatient
(Individual
Saving 3.8%)

Figure 3.3 Funding and Benefit Structure of the Social Insurance Program (Liu 2002b)
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CHAPTER IV
THE DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

China has been transforming from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy
since the early 1980s. The gross national product has grown an average of 9.5% a year
(WDI 2001). However, the governmental budgetary revenue fell, as a share of GDP, from
31.6% to only 11.1% in the period 1978-96 (WDI 2001). The great economic transition
has altered the relationship between government and its service units, including health
facilities. With the economy moving toward a free market system, the health sector in
China has been undergoing marketization. The fiscal system has been decentralized and
health care has increasingly become local matter.
The government’s financial burden on health care had been reduced because the market reform
mobilized resources from private payers and individual health units. However, these achievements
were gained at a high social cost and the policy failures were more likely higher than the successes.
The most common strategy health facilities employ to augment revenue was to increase the amount of
drugs and services they provided per patient. Therefore, the revenue-oriented behavior of health
service providers led to the provision of unnecessary services for those who can pay, and the
under-provision of necessary services for those who can not (Liu and Mills 2002)
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Fiscal Reform

Market reforms initiated a fundamental realignment of central-local relations in
China. The most noted reform was the restructuring fiscal administrative system aims at
resolving the revenue decline faced by the central government (Wong 1991). It was
reported in Chinese Financial Statistics that the central government’s budget
expenditures shrank from 40% of the total revenue in the 1970s to only 25% in 1988.
Nearly 70% of the public budget in 2002 went to sub-national administrations. Among
them, about 55% took place at the sub-provincial levels (World Bank 2003). The Chinese
health sector was experiencing financial difficulties because costs had risen more rapidly
than tax revenues. As in other transitional economies, the Chinese government has shifted
responsibility for financing services to lower levels of government (Bird et al. 1995).
The immediate consequence of the fiscal decentralization was the increasing local
governmental participation in commercial issues (Duckett 1998; Oi 1992, 1995). The
local-state corporatism (LSC) approach argued that China’s tremendous growth in
collective economy was to a great extent due to local government’s economic incentives.
The argument suggests that China’s system of fiscal contracting, by granting local
governments the right to collect and keep tax revenues, motivated these local
governments to promote business (Oi 1992). In other words, market reforms reassigned

26

fiscal power, in terms of local-central relations, downward to local government.
Local governments achieved much higher autonomy in economic issues compared to
the pre-reform era. The autonomy of local governments and the individual bureau within
them has thus increased. Local governments enjoyed control and fiscal rights over local
assets. Officers had a strong incentive to seek long-term expansion of those local
businesses. In the LSC view, the local administration served as a sort of company
headquarters, coordinating the various firms and actually became a business corporation
(Oi 1992). Not surprisingly, local governments were encouraged by the central
government to be responsible for economic issues rather than social welfare due to fiscal
constraints and profit incentives. In the reform era, local governments invested most of
their personnel and funds into commercial sectors. Some social functions, including
health care, education, and environment protection, were thus greatly ignored by the
government.
In the post-reform era, each level of government funded its own health care sector. This meant
that townships funded township health centers and counties funded county hospitals. However,
governmental contribution to the total budget of health sectors can be as low as 10% in the late 1980s
(Bloom and Tang 1999). The fiscal support of the Chinese government in health facilities was lower
than most other developing countries, where government provides 80% of the healthcare expenditure.
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Price Reform

China’s fiscal reforms were followed by enterprise reforms which are closely
connected with price reforms. Both enterprise and price reforms were crucial parts of
moving toward the commodity economy or thereafter the market economy. Before
market reform changed the Chinese economic system, all prices were set by
administrative decision. For instance, industrial good prices were determined by the
industrial bureau. State commerce bureau set wholesale and retail prices (Guo 1992).
Political rather than economic considerations determined pricing policy before the market
economic reform.
Price reforms were an important way of giving market players more autonomy and
encouraging them to be fully responsible for their business decisions. Before the market
reform, China aimed to promote social equality by providing people with basic health
services at very low prices. Prices of most health services had been kept low. Prices for
official visits and surgical operations were far below real cost (Hsiao 1995). Price
reforms introduced supply and demand and customer-service relationship into China’s
command economic system. For instance, hospitals were allowed to mark up their drugs
by 15-20% over the wholesale price. Some service prices are very flexible, hospitals can
make profits by increasing the use of new equipments (Liu et al 1996).
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First, price reforms had raised consumer prices for urban residents. Under the
market-based price system, urban residents had to pay much higher prices for
commodities. Second, price reforms had also redefined the government’s role in the
market economy. While the market pricing system constrained the government’s
intervention in the economy, it also created conflicts between the government and health
sector. Price reforms shifted the pricing mechanism from the government to health sector.
Once the health sector achieved the pricing autonomy, the government was thus driven
out of the health service. Those who were worse off were thus suffering from increased
medical prices. A study undertaken by Wong and Lee showed that 70 percent people
agreed that the government should not enhance economic development at the cost of the
social welfare provision (Wong and Lee 2001). Third, price reforms, in the long term,
shifted the price setting functions from government to market. However, the evolution
from a plan-dominated to a market-based price setting system in China’s economy had
been inextricably linked with the multiple channel phenomenon. The multiple pricing,
including market-based flexible prices at one extreme and government-oriented
regulatory prices at the other, were termed the two-tier plan/market systems (Byrd 1991:
197).
Price reforms meant an institutional arrangement transformation and a redistribution
of costs and benefits from one group to another. One significant impact of the multiple
pricing system was that farm produces were virtually undervalued. Peasants are thus put
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at a relatively disadvantaged position compared to the urban population. According to a
World Bank report, falling grain prices and the domestic slowdown since the mid-1990s
have contributed to the poverty of the rural population (World Bank 2003). Figure 4.1
shows the floating price index in the period 1977-1994. The general price index of 1994
is more than 3 times than that of 1977.
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Figure 4.1 Price Index (1977-1994)

Source: Asian Development Bank. 1995. Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The Laissez-Faire Policy

The Chinese government has adopted a laissez-faire policy toward the health sector
transition. Before the market reform launched in the 1980s, a large part of preventive
health programs was funded and managed by the government. The government invested
extensively in providing high quality drugs, hospital beds, and health manpower training.
However, financial support from virtually every level administration was cut and thus
recurrent costs of hospitals and clinics were severely reduced. Figure 4.2 indicates that
the public expenditure on health had been declining since 1990.
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Figure 4.2 Public and Private Expenditure on Health Sector (1990-1997)
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators 2001 (WDI): China.
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The government invested 2.1% of the total GDP in 1990 in the health sector. Instead
of increasing financial support from the government to meet citizens’ medical needs, we
have seen declining investments from the government. The government only allocated
2.0% of the GDP in 1997 to the health sector while the people’s demands for health care
have been increasing since the 1980s. Figure 4.3 shows the increasing household
spending on health care in the post-reform era. Figure 4.4 shows the respective shares of
the health expenditure from the governmental and private sources in the period
1997-2001. The share of government expenditure dropped from 40% in 1997 to 37.2
percent in 2001.
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Figure 4.3 Household Spending on Health Care in China (Yuan per capita)
Source: State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China. various issues. Statistical
Publishing House of China, Beijing. Also see in Wu 1997.
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Figure 4.4 Government and Private Expenditure on Health (1997-2001)
Source: WHO Selected National Health Accounts Indicators: Measured Levels of
Expenditure on Health, 1997-2001.

Hospital Autonomy

Western models of organization and management were also introduced in the health
sector. Market reforms propelled the government to adopt market mechanisms in health
facilities management. In contrast to planning disciplines, market mechanisms were more
likely to encourage competition, autonomy, and reliance on flexible policy tools rather
than regulatory methods. Prior to the market reforms, managers of health facilities
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reported directly to respective governmental and political authorities (Yung, 1991). The
health sector was a vertical hierarchical system before market forces were introduced.
Political leaders, rather than hospital managers, established health sector targets. Health
service bureaucrats then prepared technical guidelines for service development and
forced the bureaucratic system to meet the targets. Central planning and rigid
bureaucratic control limited the quality and efficiency of health services (Liu, Rao and
Fei, 1998). When market reforms were introduced in the health sector, hospital managers
had more autonomy from governmental and political structures (Bloom and Gu, 1997).
Hospital managers were entitled to manage and bear the costs of running the hospital.
The hospital autonomy was also associated with the sideline production of the health
institution (Liu et al. 1996). Driven by the economic incentive, Chinese hospitals engaged
in some businesses other than health services. Hospitals sponsored or owned businesses,
including opening shops, running restaurants, selling drugs, providing private medical
services, and operating factories. Hospitals tried to undertake sideline production
activities and encouraged health staffs to engage in the profit-seeking business. Hospital
management was thus pulled in the wrong direction. Providing adequate health services
for the public, the major goal of the hospital, was therefore substituted for the hidden
goal—generating extra revenue and maximizing the hospital income. On this account,
hospitals are no longer taking “serve the people” as their ultimate objective. Instead, they
treat patient as their customers.
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The Decentralized Health Sector

China’s health sector has been decentralized due to surging market-oriented health
service programs. For instance, for a long period the Epidemic Prevention Service (EPS)
system was the backbone of public health programs in China. One of the important
factors that contributed to China’s health sector improvement was the strengthening of
EPS (Xu 1995). The EPS system mobilized the whole society to develop and participate
in the health movement in which people were organized to maintain a healthy
environment. Before the market reforms, EPS employed more than 250 thousand workers
and extended disease control programs throughout China. It is well known that EPS was
fully funded by the respective government. Since the fiscal decentralization and market
reforms in the health sector in the 1980s, EPS has been weakened due to rising input
costs and decreasing public financial support. Public financing of EPS, as a share of GDP,
has dropped dramatically from 0.11% in 1978 to only 0.04% in 1993 (Liu et al. 1998). In
the post-reform era, EPS has had to rely heavily on user fees. Total income from user
charges increased from 20% to about 60%. A study in five counties in Beijing found that
the public expenditure for preventive services in real terms had increased slightly, but as
a percentage of the government expenditure, it had decreased from 0.53% in 1981 to 0.29
in 1990 (Zhang and Li 1995).
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Rural and township health sectors have also been decentralized. Most of the rural and
township hospitals were financed and managed directly by the County Health Bureau
before 1983. However, they were decentralized in 1984 from county to township
governments (Zheng and Hillier 1995). The township government then had the
responsibility of managing and financing rural and township hospitals. Decentralization
was reported to have promoted the autonomy and efficiency of the rural and township
hospital (Luo 1985). However, in practice, many problems were found. First, township
governments did not have the knowledge and experience to manage the health institutions.
In some poor areas, the township leadership recruited their non-professional relatives
rather than qualified professionals. Second, in some poor townships, the limited budget
on health care was used for other purposes by the township governments. The
decentralization in the poor area is rather a disadvantage for the health sector and the
citizens.
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CHAPTER V
THE HEALTH SECTOR TRANSITION UNDER THE MARKET
REFORM

In Mao’s era, China had a legacy of well organized health care system, with
emphasis on prevention. The principles of the Chinese health sector had been to “serve
the people”, focus on preventive medicines and unite traditional Chinese and Western
medical services (Hillier and Jewell 1983). China had developed a comprehensive health
care system by the late 1970s. Health services were provided to virtually all urban
residents free of charges. The rural population could receive basic health service at low
cost through the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS).
However, a major break in the development of the RCMS occurred in the early
1980s, a consequence of widespread market reforms. The rural people had to pay
out-of-pocket for medical costs. Health situations in urban areas also decreased due to
reforms in economic enterprises and the social welfare system. For instance, health
insurance, which used to provide more than 80% medical treatment cost for urban
residents, dropped to a total of only 4.7% in 1998 (MoH 1999). Health spending
increased in both rural and urban households due to various factors, such as the
improvement in the living standard and the changes in the health care system.
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The Collapse of Rural Cooperative Medical Systems (RCMSs)

It is well known that the RCMS played an important role in the consolidation of rural
health services. However, the RCMS collapsed in the early 1980s as a consequence of
widespread rural market economic reforms. These reforms basically involved a shift from
communal to household production systems. The adoption of the “household production
responsibility system” has thus changed the delivery and financing of rural health
services. Most of the RCMSs collapsed due to dramatic market reforms in rural areas
(Table 5.1). The majority of rural populations have to pay for health care out-of-pocket
again. The collapse of the RCMS has been attributed to combinations of political,
financial, and management problems (Feng et al. 1995; Carrin et al. 1999).

Table 5.1 The Percentage of Villages with RCMS (Selected Year1979-1989)
Year
% of Villages with RCMS
1979
90.0
1981
58.2
1985
11.0
1987
5.4
1989
4.8
Source: 1958-1979 figures were estimated by Anhui Medical University, 1986.
1981-1989 data are provided by the Ministry of Health.
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Prior to rural economic reform, the rural health sector was funded by the respective
government, commune, and user charges (Table 5.2). Financial resources of the rural
health services could be divided into two major categories. One category was public
expenditures: including government subsides and collective contributions, another
category was fees for services, including medical service fees and profits associated with
the drug selling.
A study shows that the governmental budget in the rural health sector sharply fell by
10% during the 1980-1989 period (Zheng and Hillier 1995). Township health centers and
county hospitals had to pay a major portion of salaries and many of them operated at a
deficit. Most village health workers, who were paid by the former communes or villages,
now had to generate their own income (Liu and Mills 2002).

Table 5.2 China’s Health Budget and Subsidies to Rural Health Care (1978-1988)
Year
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988

Health Budget*

% of Total Budget on Health
2.0
2.4
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.6

2.2
3.0
3.7
4.8
6.4
7.1

Subsidies to RCMS!
39
26
29
29
28
22

*Billion yuan
!Million yuan
Source: Du L. et al. Strategic Studies of the Chinese Health Care Financing, 1982
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Rural health facilities increasingly rely on out-of-pocket payments by medical
service users. The shrinking governmental financial support incurred increasing service
fees for township and county medical care providers. In 1989, 20.54 billion yuan of
health sector income came directly from patients while only 11.46 billion yuan came
from government budgetary allocations (Ho 1995). In some poor counties, user charges
accounted for over 75% of the county hospitals’ total revenue (Bloom and Gu 1997). The
government grants finance as low as 50% of the budgets for preventive institutes and no
more than 25% of the expenditures for hospitals and health center (Bloom and Gu 1997).
The financial burden was significantly shifted to individual households who now have to
pay for medical services out-of-pocket. Many rural people who cannot afford service fees
are then simply denied hospital care.
The rural three-tier medical network was thus weakened or even disappeared due to
the widespread market reforms. Many “barefoot doctors” who delivered basic health
services left their positions because of relatively low payments. Since the cooperative
welfare fund did not exist any more, the RCMS could no longer afford salaries for
medical professionals working in township health centers. Medical care staffs in county
hospitals were urged to negotiate contracts with their hospitals for payment schemes.
According to the Ministry of Health (MoH), the total number of barefoot doctors working
in the countryside decreased from 1.8 million to 1.3 million between 1978 and 1985
(MoH 1987).
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The three-tier medical network was terminated when rural people changed their
patterns for seeking medical services. Before rural market reforms, the three-tier medical
system worked very well in providing adequate medical services in the rural sector. The
rural people accessed medical services in their own communities through village health
stations and township health centers. Figure 5.1 shows the old pattern of seeking rural
medical service before market reforms.
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Figure 5.1 Pattern of Seeking Medical Services: Old Pattern
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However, as showed in figure 5.2, this pattern was changed when rural people
became wealthier and the RCMSs collapsed. Rural people thus went directly to county or
regional hospitals which provided better services than township health centers. As a
consequence of decreasing patient income, village health stations and township health
centers were weakened. On the contrary, the county and regional hospitals were crowded
with patients. According to a MoH report, regional hospitals have an occupancy rate of
90% compared with 80% in county hospitals and 45% occupancy rate in township health
centers (MoH 1990).
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Figure 5.2 Pattern of Seeking Medical Services: New Pattern
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The Restructuring of Urban Economy

Urban market reforms, a little later in time than rural reforms, focused on state-run
enterprises which are the highest concern in China. Urban reforms were introduced to
achieve three basic goals. First, every enterprise is required to negotiate a contract with
its respective government to set up an adequate profit and taxation level. Second,
enterprises are urged to undertake overall reforms. Life-long employment, fixed salaries,
and inadequate welfare were going to be gradually abandoned. Third, enterprises were
forced to sell their products in a competitive market and most of them were exempted
from government subsidies. For instance, the World Bank conducted a study on China’s
taxation system reforms and found that more than 80% of the enterprises had contracts
with their respective governments (World Bank 1990).
Enterprise reforms led to the disconnection of individuals with their work units.
Worker compensation is a policy welcomed by SOEs. This new policy allows the
managers to fire workers at a mutually agreed compensation. It is estimated that nearly
26 million (or one five workers) in SOEs were laid off from 1998 to mid-2002 (World
Bank 2003). Market economy requires that workers’ wages should reflect productivity.
The “iron rice bowl” policy of lifetime job security and cradle-to-grave welfare
guarantees were thus replaced by a contractual employment system. Enterprise reforms
also introduced labor market elements. First, the managers’ power in collective and
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state-owned enterprises increased significantly compared to the pre-reform era. They
could hire, discipline and dismiss workers. Secondly, in 1983, the newly-introduced
contractual employment system allowed SOEs to treat the new entrant workers
differently from the permanent workers. New entrants received neither lifetime
employment nor the same level of welfare benefits.
Bureaucrats were replaced by professional entrepreneurs. In urban reform, local
governments achieved power to shape the fiscal system to meet their own objectives
(World Bank 1990). Local government appointed the professional entrepreneurs to
manage enterprises in their districts (Duckett 1998). Some SOEs were very successful in
the market-oriented economy while others earned no profit and approximately one-third
had net losses (Hsiao 1995). Therefore, these loss-making enterprises could not pay the
required health insurance for their employees (Sun et al. 2002). The LIS in many urban
enterprises has thus collapsed by the early 1980s.
Institutional changes were introduced in the Leninist system accompanied by market
reform and decentralization of the economic decision-making system. In urban areas, the
work unit is subject to reconstruction. As required by reformers, SOEs should be adapted
to risk-sharing and profit-seeking enterprises who are eligible players in a competitive
market economic system. In most SOEs, employees are now less constrained by the
enterprise for whom they are working. The tight nexus between SOEs and their
employees is no longer a substantial relationship guaranteed by the state. Instead, a
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contractual relationship prescribing all the responsibilities and rights of the two sides,
enterprises and employees, terminates the lifelong working position of virtually every
employee. Various welfares previously provided by SOEs are now rescinded or
transferred into cash payments (Hu et al. 1999). As a result, the coverage of LIS has been
declining seriously since the late 1980s in urban areas.

Urban Health Care Reforms

Some reforms were introduced in the 1980s to improve efficiency in health care
services. There were two main changes in particular. One of them was characterized by
the self-management principle. It decentralized the management of medical care funds
from governmental or health administrative branches to health care users (work units) or
providers (hospitals) (Ho 1995). This reform aimed to motivate users and providers to
face financial constraints. The second change was to decentralize financial risks by
pooling health insurance funds which were then managed by the labor offices at the
municipal and county level and used by all covered insurants. A third party managing
institution was introduced to take care of the pooled funds. Individual accounts, under the
new contractual employment system, could be used to cover the insurant’s health care
expenditures and inherited by his or her families.
Obviously, urban health care reform has focused mostly on financial problems that
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the GIS and LIS were facing. The financial burden was no longer a big problem of the
government after introducing reforms. Public medical care (gongfei yiliao) expenditures
dropped sharply from over 30% in 1987 to only 9.8% in 1990 in the Shanghai Luwan
district (Zhou 1992:159).

From Constraining Demands to Constraining Supplies

In the health care sector, the market mechanism exerts crucial influences in
decentralizing urban health care systems. It is reported that the national health care
expenditures increased from 270 million yuan in 1952 to 22,440 million yuan in 1989
with an accelerating speed (Liu and Hsiao 1995). The increasing health expenditures
became a large state burden. Several factors contributed to this significant cost escalation.
First, increasing enrollment incurred cost escalation. Second, increases in drug prices and
medical facilities lead to big medical bills. Third, aging enrollees were a crucial factor
that drove costs up (Liu and Hsiao 1995). Another explanation is that the rampant waste
of drugs due to free availability contributed to the escalation of China’s medical cost. The
waste is partly due to medical providers’ income motives because health institutions
would generate more income through over prescribing (Wu 1997).
As a result, China implemented two reforms in the urban health insurance system to
control cost escalation. First, the government required that every urban resident insured
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by GIS or LIS share part of the medical costs when they received medical services. At the
first stage, an individual is responsible for 10-20% of the total inpatient or outpatient fees.
Second, the government further required that medical providers should be responsible for
healthcare expenses. According to this requirement, certain kinds of drugs could not be
prescribed to an insured patient unless they were paid out of the patient’s own pocket.

Pooling Risks

Prior to urban health care reform, urban residents’ health cares were differentiated
because of their places of employment. People working in different working units
(gongzuo danwei) were entitled to different welfare as well as different medical service.
The major goal of urban health care reform is to replace the work unit based schemes
with municipal schemes (Liu 2002). This reform aims to eliminate welfare differences
between urban residents and pool the financial burden risk caused by medical care
expenditures.
In 1998, the Chinese government introduced a major reform to establish a social
insurance program for urban workers (The State Council 1998). The new program was
expected to replace the existing LIS and GIS in urban areas. The new insurance system
expanded coverage to private enterprises and smaller public enterprises. Self-employed
and rural industry workers were also encouraged to buy into the program.
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In the new insurance scheme, insurants were expected to pay all of their outpatient
medical costs out of an individual saving account (see figure 3.3) until funds have been
depleted. Funds unspent in individual saving accounts are carried over to the next year.
Expenses exceeding individual savings are paid out-of-pocket. The new insurance system
pooled the risk of medical costs.

The Increasing Inefficiency and Inequality of the Health Sector

The total cost of health insurance has risen rapidly since its market oriented
economic reform in the early 1980s. The rate of increase has accelerated since 1980. The
government first used demand strategies by introducing co-payment to constrain cost
escalation. Then the government altered the strategy on hospital financing and pricing
policies for new technology and drugs. There are four factors contributing to cost
escalation: increase those covered; the inflation factor which included input price
escalation and increasing fee schedules; aging of the covered population; and residual
factors (e.g., increasing medical service demands, new equipments use, and increased
consumption of expensive drugs) (Liu and Hsiao 1995).
The price of medical services and drugs became unaffordable for many people,
especially those worse off in the reform era. Costs of health care have been rising
accelerating much more quickly than the income growth rate. Urban income per capita
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rose 18% per year during 1989-97, while the outpatient care cost increased 26% per year
and 24% per year per admission (CHSI 1999). On average, 20% of urban and 23% of
rural populations, respectively, forego inpatient hospital services recommended by health
professionals because they cannot afford the medical costs (CHSI 1999).
Medical cost escalation was due to rising in health worker pay and growth in drug
expenditures. Between 1981 and 1992, the average wage of employees in health care rose
by 84% relative to the rise in retail prices (State Statistical Bureau 1993). Spending for
medical services and drugs became a major cause of poverty. Studies showed that 25% of
households living in low-income areas who had any health services in a given year had to
borrow money to pay for their medical expenses (Liu et al. 1996). 18% of households
using health services incurred health expenditures that exceeded their total household
income in 1993 (Liu et al. 1996). To the poor, the most basic way of getting medical
financial assistance was to ask relatives and friends for help (Sun et al. 2002). In rural
areas, 28% farmers do not seek health care when seriously ill (Liu et al. 1996).
Health service inefficiency is associated with the current fee-for-service health care
system. China’s medical pricing policy is inadequate and provides incentives for
inefficiency and waste. Before the market reform, costs for services were largely funded
by the RCMS in rural areas and LIS or GIS in urban areas. Most health services and
drugs were priced substantially below cost. Conversely, health services and drugs were
often priced well above cost during the 1980s when hospitals were allowed to mark up
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their prescribed drugs by 15-20% (Liu et al. 1996).
Users often misued the free services. For instance, with the introduction of higher
charges for drugs and health services, a person who was covered for GIS or LIS would
frequently obtain medicines for his family members. Hospitals did not prevent these
abuses because they were mainly interested in selling the drugs.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The market economic reform initiated in the early 1980s had a substantial impact on
the health sector. As some scholars argued, economic reform and growth do not
necessarily improve health status for all (World Bank 1996). China’s experience shows
that economic growth or relying on market mechanisms alone is not a sufficient condition
for improvements in health status, especially for those worse off in market reforms. The
poorly-managed health facilities combined with a predatory market economy resulted in
inefficiency and reduced access to health services for most people who are vulnerable. It
is widely discussed by scholars that the market only works well with appropriate
regulations and planning. Relying too much on the free market to finance or manage
health care inevitably led to inequal access to health service between social groups,
uneven developed regions, and the like. Those worse off are more likely to suffer
escalating medical costs and diminished insurance coverage. Health services and medical
resources are more likely to be ill-managed or over-provided to the insurants or
better-offs due to the health facilities’ incentives of self-interests.
The health sector’s transition requires a balanced government role and the free
market mechanism. In China’s case, the government should play a major and active role
in the regulation and financing of the health care system. A laissez-faire policy and free
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market mechanism cannot resolve the current problems faced by the health sector. The
government support is the only reliable force for the health sector to control cost
escalation, health service inefficiency, and inequality.
Economic incentive has had a significant influence on reconstructed hospitals and
practitioners. The profit-seeking goal encourages Chinese hospitals to introduce
expensive equipment and drugs which thus increased medical costs for patients. Chinese
practitioners maximized their own interest through increasing drug prescription, adopting
expensive equipment and high-quality tests. They relied on new drugs and tests to treat
patients which inevitably increased patients’ health costs. Hospitals also increased the
inpatient stay in hospitals to compensate for their administrative inefficiencies. These
behaviors indicated that the pricing system of the health sector played an important role.
The health providers misused their autonomy to induce demand which then increased
their interest at the expense of patients. The Chinese government should realize the
market failures and implement regulatory policies on the transitional health sector.
The roles of the central and local governments in the transitional health sector need
to be reexamined. The central government needs to take more financial responsibility to
help establish a more stable health care system. The risk pooling of medical costs is a
good start to eliminate social injustice on health. The central government should
emphasize its role in the improvement of health insurance coverage and reduce unequal
access to health services among social groups and uneven developed regions. The central
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government has a key role in ensuring that health facilities provide an adequate service at
a reasonable cost. Some regulations that distort decision-making by health facilities
managers should be removed. Some mechanisms that help diminish opportunistic
behaviour of health facilities need to be created and implemented.
In this study, I do not find any evidence showing that the government has taken any
official strategies to improve health services for its citizens. The market reform gives the
government a good excuse to cut the financial supply to the health sector. Most
governmental investment goes to commercial sectors. Social services, including health
care, higher education, and environmental protection, are then left unattended. It is
widely accepted that the governmental authority has been withdrawing from the health
sector which then encourages hospital managers’ manipulation over health facilities. In
this sense, both China’s health sectors and citizens are suffering from ill-managed and
inefficient health facilities.
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